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1 - Introduction  
 
The Supreme Court of India progressively elaborated the “essential 
elements doctrine” to ascertain which elements are fundamental for a 
religious practice and which may be purged, considered as mere 
superstition, by the intervention of the State without infringing the 
principle of State neutrality in religious affairs. The doctrine has been 
discussed and in some cases applied also by constitutional interpreters in 
Pakistan and Malaysia, whose Constitutions recall the provisions on 
freedom of religion of the Indian Union, but also establish Islam as the 
religion of the State. 
The application of the “essential elements doctrine” by the apical 
Courts of these three countries allows to propose some reflections relying 
on the theory of cross-fertilization, demonstrating that “recipient” Courts 
do not follow a mere mechanism of importation but they vastly debate it. 
 
 
2 - Understanding the complexity: the role of religions in the Indian, 
Pakistani and Malaysian contexts 
 
The history of the elaboration of the “essential practice” doctrine is an 
interesting case to study the migration of constitutional interpretation 
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among legal systems1. The doctrine was elaborated by the Supreme Court 
of India and then considered and deeply discussed by its homologues in 
Pakistan and Malaysia. On the background, the inner religious pluralism 
of the societies these Courts have to deal with, and of which even 
constitutional framers seemed to be very aware of. 
In India, after the independence from the British Empire (1947), 
founding fathers tried to face the presence of a huge variety of languages, 
and of ethnic and religious groups, through a long and very detailed 
Constitution (1949)2, entrenching secularism3 and combining elements 
coming from different cultural and political system4 in order to establish a 
new national order able to overcome the inequalities suffered by the 
population. Thus, in such a plural framework, freedom of religion 
acquired a very relevant role, as it was designed to overcome the 
discriminating castes system deriving from Hinduism5 and to recognize 
and respect religious minorities, which are numerically fewer if compared 
to Hindus, but however very relevant from a political, economic and 
social point of view6.  
This complexity led to the need to comply: with the principle of 
equality, pillar of the constitutional democracy, and consequently with the 
prohibition of discriminatory treatments among groups and minorities; 
with the neutrality of the State toward any religious belief, precondition of 
the pluralistic democracy able to protect religious belonging both 
individually and collectively; with the elimination of all the obstacles to 
the enjoyment of fundamental rights for people historically subject to 
traditional cultural and religious dogmas7. 
                                                             
1 See: S. CHOUDHRY, The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2006. 
2 On the drafting of the Indian Constitution, see, among many others, B.N. RAU, 
India's Constitution in the Making, Allied publishers, Bombay, 1963; B.S. RAO, The framing 
of India's constitution, vol. 5, Indian Institute of Public Administration, Tripathi, Bombay, 
1968; S.C. KASHYAP, Our Constitution: An introduction to India's Constitution and 
constitutional law, NBT India, New Delhi, 1994. 
3 See art. 1 Const.  
4 On the different foreign ‘sources of inspiration’ of the drafting of the Constitution of 
India, see V.R. SCOTTI, India: a ‘critical’ use of foreign precedents in constitutional 
adjudication, in T. Groppi and M-C. Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges, Hart, Oxford, 2013. 
5 See G. Shah (ed), Caste and Democratic Politics in India, Anthem Press, London, 2004. 
6 According to the estimates of CIA Factbook, lastly surveyed in 2011, Indian 
population is religiously divided among Hindus (79.8%), Muslims (14.2%), Christians 
(2.3%) and Sikhs (1.7%). 
7 F. ALICINO, Libertà religiosa e principio di laicità in India, in D. Amirante, C. Decaro 
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Many elements of this complexity may be found even in Pakistan 
and Malaysia, which share with India some common grounds. They have 
a common history marked by the British colonialism and have a pluralistic 
composition of their population, where religions play a major role in the 
self-identification of groups8. From a constitutional point of view, finally, 
the discipline of the religious phenomenon is also significant. While India 
affirmed a secular legal system, explicitly set forth in the 1976 
Constitutional amendment, in Pakistan and Malaysia Constitutions 
recognize an official role for Islam as religion of the majority of the 
population, although this recognition has led to some controversies. In 
Pakistan, after the separation from India and the consolidation of the 
independence (1947), the secularism stated in the 1956 Constitution was 
soon abrogated in favor of the provision of an Islamic State (1963), which 
deeply influenced the Courts in the interpretation of the rules on freedom 
of religion. In Malaysia, on the contrary, the Constitution recognized Islam 
as the official religion of the State since its entry into force (1957), but the 
interpretation of the provisions on Islam slowly changed from the 
recognition of a mere ceremonial role to the establishment of a real State 
religion. 
Thus, the present paper focuses on the constitutional provisions 
disciplining the religious phenomenon in India, looking also at the 
influence of foreign models in their drafting as well as in their 
interpretation, in order to analyze the arguments leading to the 
establishment of “essential elements doctrine” elaborated by Indian 
judges. Because this doctrine deeply affected the debates of apical Courts 
in Pakistan and Malaysia, their interpretation and the related 
consequences on the protection of religious rights are also considered in 
order to propose concluding remarks relying on the theory of the 
migration of constitutional ideas. 
 
 
3 - The discipline of the religious phenomenon in India: which 
influences from foreign models in the Constitution? 
                                                                                                                                                                       
and E. Poestl (eds), La Costituzione dell’Unione Indiana. Profili introduttivi, Giappichelli, 
Torino, 2013, p. 196. 
8 According to the religious belonging, in Pakistan the population is divided among 
Muslims (96.4%; Sunnis 85-90%, Shia 10-15%), Christians and Hindus (3.6% together) and 
in Malaysia among Muslims (61.3%), Buddhists (19.8%),Christians (9.2%), Hindus (6.3%), 
Confucianism, Taoism and other traditional Chinese religions (1.3%) (CIA Factbook, 2010 
estimates). 
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Since the Preamble, the Constitution, as revised with the 42nd amendment 
in 1976, affirms that India is a secular State. This amendment was 
introduced in order to reaffirm the intent of the State to be neutral toward 
all the religious belongings, already stated in articles from 25 to 28 of the 
Constitution, grouped under a specific section denominated “Right to 
freedom of religion”9. The will to clearly affirm the absence of a State 
religion was based on the rationale of overcoming the strong influence 
religions traditionally have had in the public life of the country: the Hindu 
“way of life” strongly affected the social structure of the population all 
along the history of the country; during the Mughal Empire (1526-1720), 
when a Muslim elite dominated over the country10, Islam permeated in the 
law and the culture of Indian people; during the British colonization 
(1757-1947), though this had a minor influence on the decision-making 
processes and did not affected the sources of law, the Emperor merged the 
charge of King with that of Chief of the Church of England. Indeed, in 
defining the secular attitude of the State, the framers wanted to affirm that 
all the confessions would be equally treated and that religious belongings 
would not be relevant in the public sphere.  
Furthermore, the Constitution affirms that the State shall not 
compel any person to pay taxes that shall be used to foster a particular 
religion (art. 27) and that no religious teaching shall be provided in any 
educational institution wholly funded by the State (art. 28). To confirm the 
neutrality of the State, article 60 of the Indian Constitution, mirroring the 
US non-establishment clause (First Amendment) and the tradition about 
oaths and affirmations established there, allows the President of the Union 
to quote or not the name of God in the oath they must pronounce before 
taking office. Actually, the non-establishment clause seems to influence 
the whole Constitution, where there is a total absence of references to an 
established Church or to a majoritarian religion. 
The section on Right to freedom of religion opens to other 
considerations. The Constitution states that all persons are equally entitled 
to freedom of conscience and to the right to freely profess, practice and 
propagate religion, subject to public order, morality, health and to the 
existing or future laws made by the State to regulate or restricting any 
economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated to 
                                                             
9 See: M. MOHSIN, M. ALAM, Constructing Secularism: Separating ‘Religion’ and ‘State’ 
under the Indian Constitution, in (2009) 11 Australian Journal of Asian Law 29, 55, and M. 
SANKHDHER, Secularism in India, Deep&Deep Publication, Delhi, 2006. 
10 I.M. LAPIDUS, A History of Islamic Societies (3rd edn), CUP, New York, 2014, pp. 391-
413. 
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religious practice or to provide for social welfare and reform or to opening 
Hindus religious institutions to all classes of Hindus (art. 25). Thus, 
freedom of religion is intrinsically individual and cannot be subject to any 
distinction between citizen and non-citizen or among individuals because 
of their social position; furthermore, it can be subject to restriction 
deriving from the other tasks the Constitution aims to perform. Even 
without considering the limits of public order, morality and health – 
directly deriving from art. 44, 2 of the 1937 Constitution of Eire – it is 
evident that the Indian Constitution wants to balance freedom of religion 
with its other goals, as the elimination of all discriminations according to 
the principle of equality (art. 16 Const.), by intervening on the Hindus 
traditional division of the believers in castes, which are abolished, with a 
particular reference to the caste of the untouchables (art. 17 Const.)11. 
Furthermore, the Constitution guarantees the freedom to manage religious 
affairs affirming the rights of any religious denomination or of any section 
to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable 
purposes, to manage its own affairs in religious matters and to acquire 
properties and administer them according to the law (art. 26). The 
reference to religious denominations and religious sections highlights the 
importance attributed to religious groups’ internal divisions, but it also 
means that a group of believers has to obtain the legal identification as a 
religion before to be considered as a religious denomination or as a section 
of it. On the discipline of this legal identification, however, the 
Constitution remains completely silent, devolving this task to the Supreme 
Court.  
 
 
4 - The Supreme Court and the “essential elements of religion” doctrine 
 
In effect, the Supreme Court had to face the difficult task to define what 
religion is in order to overcome three kinds of challenges. First, the Court 
had to define “religion” in order to state which practices may be eligible 
for constitutional protection. Second, the Court had to resolve the appeals 
against the legislation on the managing of religious institutions. Third, the 
                                                             
11 On untouchability, see, among many others, M.K. GANDHI, The removal of 
untouchability, (2nd edn), Navajivan, Ahmedabad, 1959, M. GALANTER, Untouchability 
and the Law (1969) Economic and Political Weekly 131-170, G.S. SHARMA, Legislation and 
cases on untouchability and scheduled castes in India, Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1975, S. 
KUMAR LAL and U. RAJ NAHA, Extent of Untouchability and Pattern of Discrimination, 
Mittal, New Delhi, 1990. 
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Court had to define the limits of the independence of religious 
denominations12. These three challenges have a common base: the Court 
had to decide which elements are essentially religious. A decision that 
effectively transformed the Court in an interpreter of the tenets of the 
faiths enabling it to “strike down those tenets that conflict with the 
dispensation of the Constitution”13. Thus, in its adjudications on the 
essentiality of religious tenets, the Court elaborated the so-called 
“essential practice doctrine”, a test used for the first time in the Shirur 
Mutt case14 to draw a red line between what are matters of religion and 
what are not, even looking at the US and Australian case-laws. In fact, the 
Court rejected the definition of religion proposed in Davis v. Beason15 by 
the US Supreme Court, stating a distinction between the relation of an 
individual with his Creator (religion) and the forms of worship (mere 
practice), because it is not consistent with the Indian context, where there 
are Buddhists or Janis who do not believe in God or in any Intelligent First 
Cause. Instead, the Indian Court, also recalling the influence of the 
Constitution of Eire in the drafting of articles 25 and 26 of the Indian 
Constitution, seemed to rely on the decision Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses v. Commonwealth16, where Australian judges affirmed that the 
Constitution protects both the religious opinion and the acts done in 
pursuance of a religious belief.  
Therefore, according to the Supreme Court of India, “rituals and 
observances, ceremonies and modes of worship are regarded as integral 
parts of religion” and religious denominations behaviors must be 
considered in order to ascertain the essential practices of their own 
religion, which are protected by the State until they do not infringe the 
limits provided by articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution17. It was on these 
arguments that, in the same year of the Shirur Mutt judgment, the 
                                                             
12 R. SEN, Legalizing Religion: The Indian Supreme Court and Secularism, (2007) Policy 
Studies 30, 10. 
13 R. DHAVAN and F. NARIMAN, The Supreme Court and the Group Life: Religious 
Freedom, Minority Groups and disadvantaged Communities, in B.N. Kirpal (ed), Supreme but 
not Infallible: Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court of India, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 
2000, p. 259. 
14 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshimindra Thirtha 
Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954 SCR 1005). 
15 133 U.S. 333 (1890). 
16 67 CLR 116 (1943). 
17 C. MUDALIAR, The Secular State and Religious Institutions in India: A Study of the 
Administration of Hindu Public Religious Trusts in Madras, Schriftenreihe des Sudasien-
Instituts der Universitat Heidelberg, Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1974. 
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Supreme Court overturned the 1953 decision taken by the Bombay High 
Court in Ratilal18, where Justice Changla observed that the Constitution 
intends as religion only “whatever binds a man to his own conscience 
and whatever moral and ethical principles regulate the lives of men”. 
This decision overturned the previous judgment of the Supreme Court of 
India, in Saraswathi Ammal19, where the wives practice to set up a 
perpetuity to have worships at the burial places of their husbands, but 
relied on the Hindu scriptures to affirm that a practice to be defined as a 
“religious practice” has to be recognized by the society.  
Furthermore, Shirur Mutt, recognizing, with minor remarks, the 
constitutional legitimacy of the Madras Act regulating Hindus temples 
and institutions, became landmark case for deciding on the following 
appeals on the consistency with the Constitution of the acts regulating 
religious affairs20. 
The essential practice doctrine came into relevance even in Sri 
Venkatramana Devaru21, when the Court had to decide whether the 
exclusion of some people, the untouchables, from entering in a Hindu 
temple may be an essential part of Hinduism. Clearly, the case originated 
from the castes division provided by Hinduism and put in question the 
attempt of the State, affirmed here and there in the Constitution and 
particularly in the section on Freedom of Religion, to implement 
concretely the principle of equality. In its decision, the Court relied on a 
precedent decided by the Privy Council, Sankarlinga Nadan v. Raja 
Rajeswara Dorai22 as well as on religious scriptures.  
In particular, the Court deeply analyzed Hindus traditions coming 
to affirm that, although the worship in a temple was not an essential part 
of this religion according to the Upanishads23, it became an obligatory 
duty of the believers during the Puranic period24. Besides, it is in the 28 
                                                             
18 Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay case (1954 SCR 1035). 
19 Saraswathi Ammal v. Rajagopal Ammal (1953, 2 MLJ 63). 
20 P.K. TRIPHATI, Secularism: Constitutional Provisions and Judicial Review’, in G.S. 
Sharma (ed), Secularism: Its Implications for Law and Life in India, N.M. Triphati, Bombay, 
1966. 
21 Sri Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Misore (1954 S.C.R. 1046). 
22 Sankarlinga Nadan v. Raja Rajeswara Dorai, 5 I.A. 176 (1908). 
23 Upanishads are collection of texts, whose author/s is unknown, which contain the 
philosophic tenets of Hinduism. Probably collected between 800 and 300 b. C., for long 
time they have been orally transmitted.  
24 Traditionally, the history of Hinduism is divided in different periods of 
development: the period of the historical Vedic religion, started from about 1750 b. C.; the 
formative period of Hinduism, between 800 b. C. and 200 b. C.; the Puranic period, from 
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 5/2016 
8 febbraio 2016                                                                                                       ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
8 
 
Agamas25 that the Court found the rules prescribed to the believers on 
how a temple is to be built, where the idols are to be placed and, 
particularly relevant for the decision to issue, where the believers should 
stand.  
This distinction among worshippers was also sanctioned in the 
mentioned decision of the Privy Council, where judges affirmed that 
“under the ceremonial law pertaining to temple, who are entitled to enter 
them for worship and where they are entitled to stand and worship and 
how the worship is to be conducted are all matters of religion”. Indeed, 
clarified the essentiality of the distinction among believers according to 
Hindus religious practices and the related need to protect it according to 
the provisions on freedom of religion, the Court had to balance them with 
the abolition of the untouchability (art. 17 of the Constitution) and with 
the right of the State to open public temples to all Hindus (art. 25). 
Supreme judges affirmed that art. 17 does not apply to denominational 
temples, distinguishing  
 
“between excluding persons from temples open for purposes of 
worship to Hindu public in general on the ground that they belong to 
the excluded communities and excluding persons from 
denominational temples on the ground that they are not object within 
the benefit of the foundation”; 
 
on the contrary, according to judges, art. 25 is to be applied to all Hindus 
religious institutions, including denominational temple. Thus, the Court 
states the unconstitutionality of the exclusion of the untouchable from the 
temple, but, recognizing a minor concession to the Brahmins who founded 
the temple, admitted their exclusion during specific ceremonies to 
safeguard the distinction among believers whose essentiality has been 
recognized through the essential practice test. On this decision, it is 
noteworthy the role of interpreter of the religion the Court recognized to 
itself, deeply analyzing and debating on the content of the Hindus 
scriptures when defining whether the distinction among worshippers is 
essential or not for Hinduism, and the responsibility it took charge of 
when deciding on the ceremonies from which untouchables may be 
excluded. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
c. 200 b. C. to 500 A.D., also known as the ‘Golden Age’ of Hinduism, coinciding with the 
Gupta Empire; the Middle Ages, from roughly 650 to 1100, when the Islamic domination 
began. 
25 It is a collection of essays of Hindu devotional scholars, concerning philosophy as 
well as the religious practices believers have to follow in many field, such as meditation, 
yoga, mantras, temple construction and deity worship. 
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The “essential practice doctrine” was applied also in cases 
concerning other religious groups, which however the Court decided not 
relying on scriptures but following a secular perspective. For instance, in 
Durgah26, the appellants, the Sufi Muslim Khadims of the shrine of 
Moinuddin Chishti in Ajmer27, acted against the Durgah Khawaja Saheb 
Act of 1955, affirming that it took away their rights to manage the 
properties of the Durgah and to receive offerings from pilgrims, violating 
the religious rights of the Muslim Sufi Chishtia order. Justice 
Gajendragadkar looked at the history of the Ajmer shrine and, even 
recognizing the Chishtia order as a religious denomination, affirmed that 
since the pre-Mughal period its administration had always been 
conducted by officials appointed by the State and thus the appealed act 
was declared consistent with the Constitution and the violation of the 
religious rights was not recognized.  
For the discourse conducted here, the note of caution introduced in 
the majority opinion is very important: the Court affirms that sometimes 
there are practices, even secular ones, usually considered as part of a 
religion, which actually are just superstitions, unessential to the religion 
and hence excluded from the protection of the Constitution. Here the 
Court moved an interesting step forward in its role of interpreter of the 
religious phenomenon, because it not only confirmed its role in defining 
what is essential or not to the religion, but also recognized to itself the 
ability to rationalize religion and to purge it from mere superstitions.  
A Muslim community was involved also in Sardar Syedna28 
concerning whether excommunication can be considered an essential 
practice for the Shia sect Dawoodi Bohra. The Court, deeply reading 
Koranic provisions together with the principles affirmed in the 1948 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, argued that this kind of practice 
is contrary to both and also “out of date in modern times”; moreover, 
considering that excommunication may endanger the civil rights on 
property management of the excommunicated, the Court confirmed the 
legitimacy of the challenged Bommay Act prohibiting excommunication 
and rejected the appeal of the petitioner.  
                                                             
26 Durgah Committee v. Hussain Ali (1961 AIR 1402). 
27 Moinuddin Chishti (1141 - 1236) was an Islamic scholar who worked as an Imam in 
South Asia and finally settled in Ajmer. He introduced the Chishti Order of Sufism in 
India and had, among his followers, several Mughal emperors. 
28 Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb vs. State of Bombay (1962 SCR Supl. (2) 496). 
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The specific issue of the distinction between superstition and 
religion came again into question in Tilkayat Sri Govindlaji29, where 
supreme judges stated that, when there is a contention on competing 
religious practices, the Court may not solve it looking at what the 
community considers an integral part of its religion because the 
community itself may speak with more than one voice, so it is a duty of 
the Court to analyze if the practice is an essential part of the religion, 
extricating religious practices from secular ones. This statement seems to 
show how the Court felt self-confident on its ability in distinguishing 
secular and superstitious practices from religious ones, as it even more 
evidently appeared when the majority opinion rejected the argument of 
the appellants quoting the Australian case Adelaide Company, already 
mentioned here, that what is religion to one is superstition to another. A 
fortiori, in Shastri Yagnapurushdasji v. Muldas, the Court affirmed that the 
claim of this Satsangis group to be recognized as an independent 
denomination following the teaching of Swaminarayan was “founded on 
superstition, ignorance and complete misunderstanding of the true 
teaching of Hindu religion and of the real significance of the tenets and 
philosophy taught by Swaminarayan himself”30. 
However, as an effect of the consolidation of its case-law, the self-
attributed role of the Court to ascertain what is a religion resulted in a 
conservative attitude, able to exclude some religious groups from 
obtaining the official identification as religion. It was evident in S.P. 
Mittal31, when the majority opinion ruled that “the teaching of Sri 
Aurobindo represented only his philosophy and not a religion”, therefore 
denying to his followers the religious denomination status.  
The position of the Court was put in the pillory by the minority 
opinion of Justice Chinnappa Reddy, who argued that the concept of 
religion cannot be “confined to traditional, established, well-known and 
popular religion”, explicitly referring to Hinduism, Islamism, Buddhism 
and Christianity, but must be interpreted in an expansive way. Despite 
                                                             
29 Tilkayat Sri Govindlaji v. State of Rajasthan (1964 SCR (1) 561). 
30 1966 SCR (3) 242. Etymologically, satsang means meeting for seeking the truth. As in 
Hinduism the convention of group for common meditation and prays is considered 
among the means to reach the salvation, the establishment of several groups following 
the teaching of a specific leader seems to represent a common practice among the 
believers. In the case discussed here, therefore, the Court seems to not recognize any 
religious authority to Swaminarayan at the point of judging the content and the adequacy 
to Hinduism of his teaching. 
31 S.P. Mittal v. Union of India (1983 SCR (1) 729). 
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this objection, in subsequent cases the Court continued to follow the 
conservative approach.  
In Jagadishwaranand32, the Court recognized to Ananda Margis33 the 
religious denomination status and affirmed that its typical dance, the 
tandava34, is part of the related rites but, because of the recent affirmation 
of this worship, the dance cannot be considered among its essential 
element. This decision generated a long controversy. In 1990 the Calcutta 
High Court asked the Supreme Court to reconsider the decision, taking 
into account that the tandava was mentioned in Hindus literature, which 
the Court should carefully consider to avoid that “religious practice would 
become what the courts wish the practice to be”. Then, in Commissioner of 
Police vs Acharya J. Avadhuta35, the Supreme Court discussed again the 
issue denying once more to tandava the qualification of essential element. 
Particularly, the majority opinion stated that the essential part of a religion 
is composed by the core belief and by those practices fundamental to 
follow the belief, a character not recognized to tandava, considered as a 
simple superstructure. However, the dissenting opinion highlighted the 
crevices in such a rigid application of the “essential practice doctrine”, 
Justice Lakshmanan stating that, since essential practices are those 
“accepted by the followers of such a spiritual head as a method of 
achieving their spiritual upliftment, the fact that such practice was 
recently introduced cannot make it any the less a matter of religion”.  
While the controversies over the Ananda cases went on, the Court 
also used the “essential practice doctrine” to enlarge the State’s influence 
on the management of religious institutions through judgments affirming 
that this activity is not an essential part of religious practices. In Bramachair 
Sidheswar Bhai36, the Court stated that the establishment of educational 
institutions for the Ramakrishna Mission is not an essential practice of this 
religious denomination as well as the customary procedures to nominate 
the head of the said educational institutions, so that the State may 
intervene in the selection procedures without infringing the constitutional 
                                                             
32 Jagadishwaranand v. Police Commissioner, Calcutta (1984 SCR (1) 447). 
33 Spiritual community, whose name roughly means ‘for the diffusion of the bliss 
path’, founded during the first half of the fifties by Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar in the Indian 
State of Bihar.  
34 The name indicates the dance Shiva did to begin the circle creation, preservation, 
dissolution. In its Ananda version, it commemorates the creation of the universe. 
35 Commissioner of Police vs Acharya J. Avadhuta (case n. 6230 of 1990, decided by the 
Supreme Court on 11 March 2004). 
36 Bramachair Sidheswar Bhai vs State of West Bengal (1995 SCC (4) 646).  
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provision on freedom of religion. Similarly, in A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu37, 
the Court affirmed that the appointment of the head of a Hindu temple 
according to hereditary rules does not represent an essential part of the 
worship; hence the State’s intervention in this field must be considered 
consistent with the Constitution. Finally, following the same reasoning, in 
Pannalal Bansilal Patil38 the administration of religious institutions was 
defined as secular activity, out of religious practices. 
This attitude of the Court in deciding on very controversial cases by 
self-attributing the competence in ascertaining the content of a religious 
belief and the interpretation believers have to have remains constant in the 
case-law and it is followed still in the judgments issued in 2000s. The most 
recent case remount to 24 July 2015, when a three-judge bench rejected a 
public interest litigation (PIL), filled by a catholic nun excluded from 
taking a test because of her refusal to take off the veil, by affirming that 
“faith will not disappear” if one does not wear the veil for a short period 
with the aim of respecting rules established to ensure the fairness of a 
selection procedure. Contextually and with the same arguments, the Court 
rejected a PIL by the Students Islamic Organization of India. 
 
 
5 – The migration of the Indian essential practice doctrine in Pakistan 
and Malaysia 
 
The apex Courts of Pakistan and Malaysia discussed the essential practice 
doctrine when deciding on the protection of rights of religious minorities. 
Thus, in the following paragraphs, the relevant constitutional provisions 
on freedom of religion and on the rights of religious minorities in force in 
Pakistan and Malaysia are discussed before considering how the Courts 
used, interpreted and adapted the Indian “essential elements doctrine” to 
their national contexts. 
 
5.a - Interpreting the essential practice doctrine in Pakistan: the long-
lasting history of the Ahmadis (non)recognition 
 
Pakistan became an independent State from India in 1947 because of the 
will of the leaders of the All India Muslim League (AIML)39 to create a 
                                                             
37 A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of A.P. (1996 SC 1765). 
38 Pannalal Bansilal Patil v. State of A.P. (1996 SC 1023). 
39 Founded during the political section of the Congress of the All India Muhammadan 
Educational Conference (30 December 1906), the AIML aimed at representing Muslims 
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separate homeland for India’s Muslims, which in that area were the 
majority of the population, in order to avoid them to become a mere 
minority inside the Union of India. Despite this overwhelming Muslim 
majority, since the partition from India AIML leaders ensured the new 
State would respect religious minorities accordingly with the Islamic 
tradition40. Thus, when the first Pakistani Constitution entered into force 
(1956), art. 18 guaranteed the right of all citizen to freely profess, practice 
and propagate any religion. National courts were then asked to interpreter 
this article defining what religion is, but, very differently from their Indian 
homologues, they seemed to prefer to take the State out of the dispute. 
Indeed, in Moula Bux41, the Chief Court of Sind affirmed: 
 
“It is not permissible to any Court to enquire further into the state of 
the mind and the beliefs of a person who professed to belong to a 
particular faith and inquire whether his actual beliefs conformed to 
the orthodox tenets of that particular faith”.  
 
In 1954, the Court of Inquiry, constituted to enquire into the 
disturbances occurred in Punjab in 1953 because of the clashes between 
Sunni ulama and the pretended-to-be Muslim sect of Ahmadis42, used 
almost the same reasoning. The Court stated “it is not our business to give 
findings whether Ahmadis are or are not within the pale of Islam […] 
because no two ulama have agreed before us to the definition of a 
Muslim”43. 
To support its decision, the Court of Inquiry also discussed the 
evolution of fundamental rights in the international law, specifically 
considering freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and affirmed 
                                                                                                                                                                       
during the British Empire and, meanwhile India defined its independence, it also 
supported the idea of creating a Muslim motherland separated from the Indian State. 
40 Muhammad Ali Jinnah made a specific reference to the toleration of Islam toward 
religious minorities on 18 August 1947, just few days after he sworn as Pakistan’s first 
Governor-General, while celebrating the end of the Ramadan. 
41 Moula Bux v. Charuk (1952 PLD Sind). On the protection of religious minorities, 
see: M. TAYYAB, Freedom of Religion and Religious Minorities in Pakistan: A Study of 
Judicial Practice, (1995) Fordham International Law Journal, 1. 
42 Founded in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in the Indian State of Punjab, this 
religious movement self-attributes the duty of renovating Islam by purging it by any 
justification of hate and professing peace and concord among people. The very 
controversial point, which distinguish Ahmadis from all the other Muslim groups, is 
their attribution to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of the epithet of Prophet and their belief that 
Allah periodically has sent and will send prophets even after Mohammad, instead 
considered as ‘the seal of Profethood’ in the classical, Sunni and Shia, Muslim belief. 
43 Lahore Government Print, Report of the Court of Inquiry, 1954. 
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that taking a decision on the religious qualification of Ahmadis would 
infringe those rights and ostracize Pakistan from international society. 
Thus, a context where leading forces were secular allowed courts to take 
the distance from religious questions affirming the equality of all religions 
in front of the State and the consequent need that it does not interfere in 
the definition of the content of beliefs. 
Become an Islamic Republic since the 1963 first constitutional 
amendment to the 1962 Constitution44 and confirmed in its Islamic 
belonging after the approval of the 1973 Constitution45, Pakistan formally 
continued to protect freedom of religion and the concerned provisions – 
still in force in 2015 – seem to be very similar to the Indian ones. In fact, 
even if secularism has no room in the country as “Pakistan shall be a 
Federal Republic to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan” (art. 1) 
and “Islam is the State religion” (art. 2), the provisions on freedom of 
religion recall – with minor but sometimes relevant differences – the 
Indian ones46. Particularly, art. 20 states that, subject to law, public order 
and morality, every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice and 
propagate his religion and every religious denomination and every sect 
thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious 
institutions. The provision seems to use almost the same wording of art. 25 
of the Indian Constitution, but the reference to citizenship turns the 
recognition of the right to all the individuals, as it is in India, in a 
recognition granted only to Pakistanis. Similarly again to the Indian 
provisions, art. 21 prohibits to compel people to pay any special tax the 
proceeds of which are to be spent on the propagation or maintenance of 
any religion other than their own. 
These provisions broadly protect religious freedom, even though 
such protection become controversial when concerning religious 
                                                             
44 Because of the beginning of political troubles, in October 1958, the then President 
Iskander Mirza abrogated the Constitution. Shortly afterwards General Ayub Khan 
deposed Iskandar, declared himself President and, on 17 February 1960, appointed a 
Commission to draft a new fundamental law for the country. The draft was presented on 
6 May 1961 and came into effect on 8 June 1962. The Constitution contained 250 articles 
divided into twelve parts and three schedules. 
45 The second martial law was imposed on 26 March 1969, when President Ayub Khan 
abrogated the Constitution of 1962 and handed over power to the Army Commander-in-
Chief, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. On assuming the presidency, General 
Yahya Khan acceded to popular demands by abolishing the one-unit system in West 
Pakistan and ordered general elections on the principle of one man one vote. 
46 See: B.M. CHENGAPPA, Pakistan: the Role of Religion in Political Evolution, (2008) 
Strategic Analysis, 12. 
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minorities, particularly after the approval of the 1974 Constitution (second 
amendment) Act. Modifying art. 260 of the Constitution defining the 
terms used therein, the amendment explicitly defined Muslimhood, 
stating that a person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified 
finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad […] is not a Muslim for the 
purposes of the Constitution or law. 
Once again, the reasons for the approval of this Act are based in the 
controversy between Sunni ulama and Ahmadis, but this time the 
Parliament strongly intervened and complied with the ulama’s requests, 
probably to bind this lobby to the new constitutional order. Relying on the 
definition provided in art. 260, in Mobashir47 ulama asked the Lahore High 
Court to limit the practices of Ahmadis distinguishing them from 
Muslims. The Court declared that “it is a policy of the State to protect all 
religions but to interfere with none”, but could not question the legitimacy 
of the second amendment the stare decisis principle obliging it to follow the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan previous decision in State v. Zia-ur-Rahman48. 
Therefore, the Court could not help but made the ulama’s wish to exclude 
Ahmadis from the group of Muslim sects.  
Achieved this, ulama continued to pressure against Ahmadis on 
Government of General Zia-ul-Haq49, which, on 26 April 1984, issued the 
Ordinance XX50. This act amended article 298B and 298C of the Penal Code 
criminalizing the practices of Ahmadis’ religion, included the simple use 
of the epithet “Muslim” to qualify themselves. As a consequence, 
Ahmadis filed the Constitutional petition n. 2309 of 1984 to the Lahore 
                                                             
47 Mobashir v. Bokhari (1978 PLD Lah.). 
48 (1973 PLD S.Ct.). According to the Court, as long as the procedure to amend the 
Constitution was followed, the Judiciary cannot question the substance of an 
amendment. This decision clearly rejects another doctrine elaborated by the Supreme 
Court of India, the basic structure of the Constitution doctrine, forbidding the Parliament 
to amend those provisions representing the basic structure of the Constitution, 
represented by a main core whose modification would change the whole content of the 
legal system. The doctrine was elaborated in Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of 
Kerala (1973, 4 SCC 225) and henceforth evolved adapting and modifying the content of 
the basic structure. See: T.R. ANDHYARUJINA, The Kesavananda Bharati case: the untold 
story of struggle for supremacy by Supreme Court and Parliament, Universal Law Publishing 
Co., Delhi, 2011. 
49 General Zia was the author of the coup d’état which subverted the government of 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on 5 July 1977; on the same day the martial law was declared and the 
Constitution was suspended sine die. On 16 December 1978, General Zia officially 
became the President of Pakistan. 
50 The Ordonance is officialy named “The Anti-Islamic Activities of the Quadani 
Group, Lahori Group, and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance”. 
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High Court pretending the Ordinance violated their religious rights. The 
Court quickly dismissed the petition affirming that the Constitution was 
suspended with the declaration of the Martial Law on 5 July 1977, and so 
legislative power was not bound to any constitutional limit. The appeal to 
the Federal Shariat Court51 was also dismissed because, according to this 
Court, Ordinance XX was a direct consequence of the 1974 constitutional 
amendment declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims52. It is noteworthy that 
this Court did not avoid to discuss the possible violations of article 18 of 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights deriving from the 
Ordinance, although, according to a very contestable interpretation, it 
stated “there is nothing in this charter to give to the citizens of a country 
the right to propagate or preach his religion”. As a last resort, in 1988, 
Ahmadis appealed the Supreme Court of Pakistan, whose decision is 
pivotal for the discourse on the judicial interpretation of a foreign doctrine 
proposed in this essay.  
In Zaheeruddin53, Ahmadis claimed that Ordinance XX violated their 
fundamental right to freedom of religion as protected by art. 20 of the 
Constitution. The majority opinion, delivered by 4 judges of the 5 
composing the bench, deeply discussed the arguments put forward by the 
petitioners, but finally affirmed that some terms are peculiar of Islam and 
the State have the duty to protect them from being used by other religious 
groups. Furthermore, being an Islamic State, Pakistan must protect Islam 
from religious communities wrongly claiming to be Muslim and so 
Ahmadis, not fitting with the definition of Muslim provided by the 1974 
constitutional amendment, cannot use symbols and terms connected with 
Islam. Moreover, because in an Islamic State Islamic law is the positive 
law of the land, the right to freedom of religion can be limited when it 
infringes Islamic precepts. Finally, the Court discussed the extent of 
freedom of religion, calling into question the essential practice doctrine in 
order to affirm that such a freedom only protects integral and essential 
parts of the religion and that it is a duty of the Court itself to determine 
whether some practices are integral and essential parts of a religion. Then, 
                                                             
51 This Court was established by the Presidential Order n.1 of 1980 to determine 
whether laws comply with Sharia, the Islamic Law and to revise criminal courts 
jurisdiction in hudud cases (cases concerning what is forbidden according the Sharia). It is 
composed by 8 Muslim judges, 3 of which are required to be Ulema, appointed by the 
President of Pakistan for a 3 years term, which may eventually be extended by the 
President. 
52 Majibur Rehman v. the State (1985 PLD, FSC). 
53 Zaheeruddin v. the State (1993 SCMR 1718). 
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the Court went further stating that even when there are constitutionally 
protected essential elements, they can be limited if their exercise leads to 
law and order problems.  
Explicitly quoting the Indian case Duragh, the Court noted that 
being such limitations to freedom of religion consistent with the 
Constitution of a secular State as India, a fortiori they are consistent in an 
Islamic State, where the protection of Islam is a fundamental task of the 
institutions. However, the Court did not entirely base its decision on 
Indian case-law, which is sometimes cited a contrario. In this decision, in 
fact, the Court quoted also the Indian case Syedna on excommunication, 
but in order to declare excommunication as an integral part of the religion. 
Coupling this declaration with Ahmadis constant affirmation that they are 
different from any other Islamic group, the majority opinion stated that 
once Ahmadis had affirmed their difference from the Islamic majority they 
cannot pretend to use symbols, terms and practices typical of Islam, which 
could induce confusion in the believers and realize a proselytism based on 
the misunderstanding of worshippers. 
 
5.b - Cloths and Words always matter. The essential doctrine in 
Malaysia 
 
When obtaining the independence from Great Britain in 1957 with the 
official denomination of Federation of Malaya, Malaysia had to manage a 
population whose traditional religion was animism but whose 60% 
declared itself as Muslim, while the rest was divided among Buddhists, 
Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Baha’i’s and practitioners of the traditional 
Chinese religions. The Constitution entered into force in the same year 
seemed aware of this pluralism as well as of the majoritarian presence of 
Muslims. Thus, according to the Constitution, “Islam is the religion of the 
Federation; but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in 
any part of the Federation” (art. 3) being recognized the right to profess, 
practice and propagate any religion (art. 11, 1) and the prohibition to 
compel believers in paying taxes the proceeds of which are specially 
allocated in whole or in part for the purposes of a religion other that their 
own (art. 11, 2). 
Nevertheless, religious freedom is bound to the respect of public 
order, health and morality (art. 11, 5) and to the prohibition of 
propagating “religious doctrine or beliefs among persons professing the 
religion of Islam” (art. 11, 4). Finally, every religious group has the right to 
manage its own religious affairs, to establish and maintain religious 
institutions and to acquire and own properties (art. 11, 3). Interestingly, 
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Islam represents a connotative element to define a Malay person as well, 
who in fact is conceived as an individual professing the religion of Islam, 
habitually speaking the Malay language and conforming to the Malay 
custom (art. 160)54. 
Finally, Islam directly influences the functioning of the institutions, 
and particularly of the Judiciary, providing the Constitution for Syariah 
Courts (sharia courts)55 competent in judging on disputes among Muslims 
in matters such as family law and property rights. An influence affecting 
also the internal cohesion of the law and possibly the legal certainty, as 13 
systems of Islamic administration and Islamic law, one for each member 
state of the Federation, have been established56. 
Given this set of provisions, the interpretation of the role of Islam in 
the public sphere and the definition of who a Muslim is become a very 
important task also for the Malaysian Supreme Court. In Che Omar Che 
Soh57, the Supreme Court stated that the Constitution provides for a 
ceremonial role of Islam and that it is the civil law – intended as opposite 
to the religious one – that governs Malaysia, also relying on art. 4 of the 
Constitution according to which “the Constitution is the supreme law of 
the Federation”. Despite this decision, Courts progressively recognized a 
preeminent role for Islam. In Kamariah58, the Federal Court justified its 
refusal to allow conversion out of Islam stating that being Islam the 
religion of the Federation it has a special status. Lower courts followed 
this approach, as evident in Lina Joy59, when the High Court of Kuala 
Lampur relied on art. 160 of the Constitution to affirm that since the 
plaintiff is a Malay, by that definition she cannot renounce her Islamic 
religion. 
While declaring its preeminence, Courts debated on the essential 
elements of Islam as well, deeply arguing on the doctrine elaborated by 
the Indian Supreme Court. Thus, when art. 11, 4 of the Constitution was 
                                                             
54 See J. LING-CHIEN NEO, Malay Nationalism, Islamic Supremacy and the 
Constitutional Bargain in the Multi-ethnic Composition of Malaysia, (2006) International Journal 
on Minority and Group Rights, 13. 
55 See: 1988 Constitutional Amendment Act n. A704 of 10 June 1988, and 1994 
Constitutional Amendment Act n. A885 of 24 June 1994 
56 A. HARDING, The Keris, the Crescent and the Blind Goddess: the State, Islam and the 
Constitution of Malaysia, (2002) 6 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law, 154-
180, p. 169. 
57 Che Omar Che Soh v. Public Prosecutor (1988, 2 MLJ 55). 
58 Kamariah bte Ali dan lain-lain v. Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan, Malaysia dan satu lagi (2002, 
3 MLJ 657).  
59 Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah (2004, 2 MLJ 119). 
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 5/2016 
8 febbraio 2016                                                                                                       ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
19 
 
challenged because of the dress codes related to some religious groups, 
Courts affirmed the competence of the State to limit religious practices 
concerning their non-essential elements. In Hjh Halimatussaadiah60, the 
Federal Court rejected the appeal of a woman asking to wear the purdah61 
at work, adumbrating for the first time the use of the essential practice 
test, but naming it “integral part test”. Discussing the reasons that should 
allow the woman to wear the purdah, the Court affirmed that this 
garment is not an essential part of her religion and thus it may be 
prohibited by the State in the public interest, as a non-essential religious 
practice. According to the same reasoning, in Meor Atiqulrahman62, the 
Court rejected the appeal of Muslim boys claiming a right to wear turbans 
at school infringed by a 1997 School Regulation excluding these cloths, 
among some other traditional ones, from the school’s uniform63. 
In this second case, the discussion on the use of foreign precedents 
seems to have a great momentum. When the pupils were expelled from 
schools for not complying with the regulation, their fathers appealed the 
High Court and, referring to art. 25 of the Indian Constitution to define 
what religion is and relying on Indian case-law on the topic, argued that a 
religion may provide for forms of worship that are an integral part and 
may include food and dress prescriptions. Accepting this reasoning, the 
Court stated that wearing a turban is an integral part of the Hakum Syarak 
religion and ordered the school to readmit the expelled pupils. 
Consequently, the school appealed the Court of Appeal, which applied 
again the essential practice test and quoted several Indian judgments and 
other foreign precedents the Indian Court had referred to, such as the US 
and the Australian ones. The Malaysian Court of Appeal explicitly used 
the essential practice test elaborated in India to affirm that what constitute 
an integral part of a religion has to be ascertained by the Court itself “with 
reference to the doctrine of a particular religion and include practices, 
which are regarded by the community as a part of the religion”. Relying 
on the Syedna case, judges also clarify that the fact that a practice is 
                                                             
60 Hjh Halimatussaadiah bte Hj Kamaruddin v. Public Service Commission, Malaysia (1994, 3 
MLJ 61). 
61 Literally, it means "curtains". It is the veil Malaysian women use to wear in order to 
respect the social practice imposing them to completely cover their face and body when 
they are not at home. 
62 Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak v. Fatimah Sihi (2006, 4 MLJ 605). 
63 L-A. THIO, J. LING-CHIEN NEO, Religious Dress in Schools: the Serban Controversy 
in Malaysia, (2006) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 3. 
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integral to a religion has to be proved with “relevant and admissible 
evidence”.  
Indeed, considering that the fact that wearing a turban is an integral 
part of Islam had not be consistently proved, the Court dismissed the 
appeal and considered lawful the school regulation forbidding pupils to 
wear it. The final decision was taken by the Federal Court, whose majority 
opinion, even dismissing their appeal, confirmed the arguments of the 
plaintiffs and stated that the Court of Appeal was too strongly influenced 
by Indian case-law and had not considered that as for the Preamble of its 
Constitution India is a secular State, while in Malaysia Islam has a specific 
constitutional recognition. Thus, Justice Mohammad, author of the 
judgement, formally rejected the essential practice doctrine but an echo of 
it can be perceived in his reasoning. In fact, he affirmed that in order to 
consider a practice protected by the provision on freedom of religion, one 
must prove that there is a religion, that there is a practice, and finally that 
the practice is a practice of a religion. Only after such demonstrations, 
according to Justice Mohammad, one has to prove that the religion 
considers the practice compulsory. On this ground, the judge affirmed that 
the wearing of turban is not mandatory for Islam, so the appeal was 
dismissed. 
The Federal Court came again on the dangerousness of the use of 
foreign precedents when deciding in Menteri Dalam Negeriv64. The case 
originated from the Cabinet ban of the Catholic newspaper “The Herald” 
for having used the word “Allah”, according to the Cabinet, willing to 
arouse the sensitivity of Muslims65. The appeal of The Herald in front of 
the High Court in 2009 resulted in a dismissal of the ban because, relying 
on the mentioned case on turbans and using the essential practice test, the 
Court affirmed that the use of the word “Allah” is “an essential part of the 
worship and instruction in the faith of the Malay speaking community of 
the Catholic Church in Malaysia”. The Home Ministry appealed against 
this decision and the Court of Appeal, highlighting the dangerousness in 
deciding inter-faith questions looking at foreign precedents, confirmed the 
Cabinet’s ban. Even in this case, a formal rejection of the essential practice 
doctrine was followed by a practical use of the test it consists of. The Court 
of Appeal affirmed that the use of the Word “Allah” is not necessary for 
the worship of Malay Christians, which should decide to use other words 
to indicate God, in addition because even in the Bible the word does not 
                                                             
64 Menteri Dalam Negeri v. Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lampur (2013, 6 
MLJ 468) 
65 See: Home Minister order of 7 January 2009. 
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appear. After another appeal of the Christian community, the Federal 
Court had the final say on the issue and confirmed both that the reliance 
on foreign precedent may heighten rather than defuse tensions when 
adjudicating an intra-religious dispute and the decision of the Court of 
Appeal on the legitimacy of the ban. 
 
 
6 - Concluding remarks 
 
The definition of a “correct meaning of religion” seems to be an important 
topic for the making of the decolonized India since the constituent 
debates, where the recognition of a public role for religions was deeply 
discussed in the lack of consensus on the way to conceive secularism. 
Different positions arose: Ambedkar66 proposed to leave little room 
for religions in the public sphere; Munshi67 constantly suggested taking 
into account the strong relevance of religions for Indian people; Nehru68, 
whose position finally prevailed as already noted, proposed the equal 
respect of all religions and defined the secular State as a State recognizing 
a free play for all religions, until they do not interfere with each other or 
with the basic conception of the State itself. 
Even the essential practice doctrine was foreshadowed during 
constituent debates as Ambedkar said: 
 
“there is nothing extraordinary in saying that we ought to strive 
hereafter to limit the definition of religion in such a manner that we 
shall not extend it beyond beliefs and such rituals as may be 
connected with ceremonials which are essentially religious”69. 
 
Henceforth, the Supreme Court elaborated the doctrine according 
to subsequent waves of evolution. During the Fifties, the Court seemed to 
strictly follow Nehru’s idea of a free play for all religions, rejecting a too 
                                                             
66 Bhimrao Ramji Ambedekar (14 April 1891 – 6 December 1956), was a jurist and an 
economist actively participating in the drafting of the Indian Constitution. He was also 
the first Law Minister of the independent India. 
67 Kanaiyalal Maneklal Munsh (30 December 1887 – 8 February 1971), educationist and 
lawyer, he was member of the Indian Constituent Assembly. 
68 Probably the most know of the three Indian politician mentioned, Jawaharlal Nehru 
(14 November 1889 –27 May 1964) was political and spiritual heir of Gandhi and was the 
first Prime Minister of the independent India. He also served as a member of the Indian 
Constituent Assembly. 
69 See: Constituent Assembly Debates, 507-8, cit. in G.J. JACOBSOHN, The Wheel of Law: 
India's Secularism in Comparative Constitutional Context, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2009, p. 98. 
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narrow definition of religion and allowing each religious denomination to 
define the essential practice of its worship. In the following decade, 
however, the Court seemed to recognize protection only to those practices 
suitable to make religion as a tool of modernization, thus stating a strong 
distinction between religion and superstition notwithstanding the opinion 
of the concerned religious denominations. During this period, the 
consistency with constitutional provisions of the acts regulating the 
intervention of the State in the administration of temples was also 
affirmed. Such interpretation consolidated during the Eighties and the 
Nineties, probably because of the increasing political influence of Hindu 
nationalism, which shifted the Court’s role from the interpretation of the 
content of religion and the purge of irrational elements to the 
legitimization of the State intervention in religious affairs70. 
The Pakistani and Malaysian Courts followed almost the same path, 
with some differences from India that are worth considering. In the Union 
of India, the essential practice doctrine was introduced to manage the 
difficult task of individuating the limits of religious autonomy and of State 
intervention. On the contrary, in Pakistan and Malaysia the Courts used 
the doctrine to decide on issues concerning the control on the State and on 
religious minorities by the majoritarian religion.  
To justify these differences there are some elements linked to the 
legal and socio-historical contexts of the countries. In Pakistan, the 
Ahmadis controversy had become a reason of cleavages among the 
population so that judges justified a decision – the prohibition for 
Ahmadis to use the epithet of Muslim – grounded on the need to 
safeguard public order using the legal escamotage that Ordonnance XX 
was issued during the martial law period. In Malaysia as well, judges 
issued decisions aimed at not altering the social context in a period of 
“fragility”. In fact, by declaring Islam as the State religion but not 
Malaysia as an Islamic Republic, framers surely intended to respect the 
secular nature of the State avoiding the establishment of a theocratic 
regime71, but, as the political debate became more and more focused on 
the role constitutionally provided for Islam, judges probably considered 
inappropriate to deal with such a sensitive issue starting from a foreign 
point of view. 
Some considerations to explain the decisions of the Courts may 
pertain to the personal experiences of judges. In Pakistan, Chief Justice 
                                                             
70 See: R. SEN, Legalizing Religion, 29. 
71 J.M. FERNANDO, The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia, (2006) Journal 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2, 266. 
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Chaudhary wrote the majority opinion after having seen his predecessor 
quickly dismissed for having previously taken a decision contrary to the 
wills of the military regime. In Malaysia, it could not be a mere 
coincidence that, in the turban case in front of the Court of appeal, the 
references to Indian case-law and the proposal of the argument that Islam 
should not be privileged in front of religious minorities were introduced 
by a judge with Indian origins. 
From a broader point of view, the “essential practice doctrine” as 
applied in India, Pakistan and Malaysia offers the opportunity to add 
some hints in the debate on cross-fertilization. Those who argue against 
cross-fertilization, citing the Montesquieu’s theory according to which 
each rule serves its community, should consider the impact of 
globalization on this theory72. The increasing affirmation of a global 
community sharing the same point of view on the management of some 
fundamental rights may allow legislators and judges to use the same 
framework. It is evident in the cases discussed. In all the three countries 
examined, there is the same problem of dealing with a pluralistic society, 
but characterized by a strong religious majority, where constitutional 
provisions, almost with the same wording, express the same attitude 
toward the phenomenon. Indeed, judges’ interpretation tends to follow 
the same legal doctrine, the “essential practice doctrine” (whatever the 
used denomination of the theory may be in concrete). This happens 
because probably “those who interpret local constitutional traditions take 
a lively interest in how their counterparts in other jurisdictions interpret 
their own traditions”73. Nevertheless, the interpreters are not prone to a 
simply reception nor they merely cherry-pick only those decisions that 
may fit with their point of view. 
Judges demonstrated that they deeply discuss foreign 
interpretations and, when deciding to follow them, there is always an 
effort of adapting them to domestic situations. Finally, this adaptation 
could represent an argument against the theory that the use of foreign 
precedents as to be conceived as contrary to the democratic rules. In fact, 
Supreme Courts, even entitled to judge on constitutional matters, are 
selected according to the procedures defined by the Constitution and 
interpret it according to a competence specifically attributed. We may then 
discuss on the general adherence to democracy of the constitutional texts 
                                                             
72 See: A. SLAUGHTER, A Global Community of Courts’, (2003) Harvard International 
Law Journal, 44; A. SLAUGHTER, A New World Order, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2004. 
73 A. BRUDNER, Constitutional Goods, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. VIII. 
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of the countries analyzed, but once this point is overcome, cross-
fertilization cannot be conceived as undemocratic, as it represents just one 
of the interpretative tools at the disposal of judges. 
 
